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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In Mandle v. Brown,41 there was no promotion involved which violated
the New York Constitution or the Civil Service Law. "A transfer from one po-
sition within a grade to another in the same grade with more important duties
and w"r21 larger salary is regarded in a sense as a promotion. Such is not, how-
ever, the statutory meaning of the term." 42
Notice to Political Subdivision for Administrative Hearing
Section 46(8) of the Correction Law empowers the Correc(tion Commis-
sion to close any county jail which is unsafe, unsanitary or inadequate to pro-
vide for the separation and classification of prisoners required by law.43 In act-
ing to close a county jail, the Commission must send a citation to the sheriff
and clerk of the board of supervisors to appear before the Commission and
show cause why the jail should not be closed. After a hearing, the Commis-
sion is empowered to order the jail closed, the county having ninety days with-
in which to institute an Article 78 proceeding for review of the order.
In 1955, the Commission ordered an inspection of the Cayuga County
jail resulting in two reports. One of these reports related only to a general un-
cleanliness while the other was a great deal more detailed, concerning structural
defects, obsolete equipment and lax administration. Only the former report was
supplied with the citation ordering the county to show cause why the jail should
not be dosed, but, when the hearing came up, the county representatives were
faced with the more detailed report which they claimed they were unprepared
to rebut or explain. As a consequence of the hearing, the jail was ordered
closed and the county sought to have the order annulled by the Appellate Divi-
sion under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act.
The Appellate Division remanded the case to the Commission for another
hearing on the ground that a proper hearing in accord with the statute had not
been held, the county having had no opportunity to dispute or refute the mat-
ters in the second report and having been misled into answering only the
charges contained in the first report.44 The Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the key to the sufficiency of the hearing was the question whether the
Correction Commission was acting in a quasi-judicial or an administrative ca-
pacity.45 The Court adopted the latter answer.
The theory of the opinion is that counties are mere political subdivisions
41. Supra, note 37.
42. Sanger v. Greene, 269 N.Y. 33, 41, 198 N.E. 622, 625 (1935).
43. N. Y. CORRECTION LAw §46(8).
44. Cayuga County v. McHugh, 3 A.D.2d 300, 160 N.Y.S.2d 473 (4th Dep't
1957).
45. Cayuga County v. McHugh, 4 N.Y.2d 609, 176 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1958).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
of the state, possessing only those powers granted or permitted by the legisla-
ture.4 6 Since county jails exist only by statutory enactment,47 the legislature
could abolish them completely, without permission of the counties. If it could
abolish them, the Court reasons, it could also regulate them as it saw fit. By Ar-
ticle 17, section 5 of the New York Constitution, the Correction Commission
is given the duty of inspection. In addition, the legislature has delegated to it
the power of closing the jails by the procedure outlined in section 46(8) of
the Correction Law. Although a hearing is provided for, the Court concludes
that it is administrative in nature, requiring only that the Commission deter-
mine whether to close the jail or not, and that in this determination, the Com-
mission is acting as an arm of the legislature.
Strictly construed, there is nothing in the statute which requires that the
county be notified of any more than the time and place of the hearing. The
county is merely ordered to show cause why the jail should not be dosed and
there is no requirement that evidence be presented. The Appellate Division ap-
proached the problem with the assumption that the action was quasi-judicial in
nature and from this determined that a fair hearing was required to prevent its
becoming a mere sham. This would seem to be a valid conclusion even if the
action were characterized as strictly administrative. It does not seem reasonable
that the legislature, in enacting section 46(8) intended that the hearing therein
provided should merely rubber stamp a determination of an inspection team. On
the other hand, under the circumstances of this case, despite the superficial
inequity, it cannot be said that there was arbitrary or capricious action on the
part of the Commission. The jail was in fact inadequate, obsolete, unsafe and in
need of replacement. The county was well aware of this situation and had been
resisting the Correction Commission in this regard for a number of years. Nor
were its representatives at the hearing surprised at the contents of the second
report. The Commission had received too many promises; now it wanted action.
To remand the case would result in the same conclusion, i.e., that the jail must be
dosed until it was properly repaired or a new one built.
Civil Service, Prior Service Credit-Per Curiam
In Tarner v. Levitt48 the Court held in a per curiam opinion that employment
as a town clerk in which petitioner was in effect paid solely by the town clerk
under a private arrangement (by which part of the pay was in the form of
retention by the petitioner of license fees which belonged legally to the town
clerk), did not constitute paid government service within the meaning of the
46. N. Y. COUNTY LAW §3; Markey v. Queens County, 154 N.Y. 675, 49
N.E. 71 (1898).
47. N. Y. COUNTY LAw §217.
48. 4 N.Y.2d 169, 173 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1958).
